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THE CASE FOR TAX LOOPHOLES

This booklet is one in a series designed to enhance
the understanding of the private enterprise system
and the key forces affecting it. The series will provide a forum for considering vital current issues in
public policy and for communicating these views
to a wide audience in the business, government,
and academic communities. Publications will
include papers and speeches, conference proceedings, and other research results of the Center for
the Study of American Business.

Presenting the case in favor of tax loopholes may seem to be an example of
trying to defend the indefensible. Loophole, of course, is a perjorative term
indicating some special advantage that a person or group has achieved,
presumably at the expense of the public welfare. And, as we are told repeatedly, eliminating all of the loopholes would permit a massive reduction in tax
rates without any overall decline in revenues.
The implicit trade-off sounds so desirable that we may wonder why the
change has not been made before. An obvious answer of course quickly comes
to mind: the special interests have prevented it. Although that may be the
popular answer, a quite different one will be presented here, one which is
based on a broader view of public policy. We will examine the role of these
special tax provisions in the light of the totality of governmental tax, expenditure, and regulatory activities, especially as these affect the relationship of
public to private activities in the United States.* But before doing so, we will
cover some preliminary material. It will be helpful to examine the nature of
the various loophole arrangements and their impacts on the tax system of
which they have become so basic a part.
Technically, the term loophole-at least in my understanding-applies to
that broad and disparate range of specific provisions in the tax code which
permits one or more taxpayers to depart from the general structure used for
taxing income. To clear the air at the outset, I am not about to defend every
"raid" on the Treasury. That is, I will not be supporting the desirability of
each and every special provision of the Internal Revenue Code. As a general
proposition, I do favor the economic notion of "horizontal equity" -that is,
equal treatment of taxpayers in similar circumstances. And it should be recognized that a "cleaner" tax code-one with fewer special provisions-likely
would help to achieve a greater degree of horizontal equity.
Yet, it needs to be acknowledged that there is room for a good degree of
legitimate quibbling as to who are the equals to be treated equally. The taxpayer who devotes a portion of his or her income to voluntary contributions to
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eleemosynary institutions may quite properly be viewed ·a bit differently than
the taxpayer with identical income who devotes all of that income to his or her
personal gratifications. This would seem to be one of the many instances in life
where sensible results are more likely to be achieved by carefully balancing a
variety of important considerations, rather than single-mindedly attempting
to pursue just one.
In this brief examination of the composition of tax loopholes I will, of
course, try to avoid the obvious distinction that those special tax provisions
which benefit me are essential to the public welfare, but those that benefit you
are just low priority giveaways. As Professor Boris Bittker explained on this
campus on an earlier occasion, there are very few tax provisions which meet
the formal dictionary definition of loophole, that is, "an ambiguity or omission
in a statute, etc., which affords opportunity for evading its intention."l In the
main, tax loopholes are not the product of an ingenious attorney or accountant laboriously examining the minutia of the Internal Revenue Code. Rather,
the typical loophole was deliberately placed there by the Congress to achieve
a public purpose, a purpose of which you or I may speak good or ill. Even as
enthusiastic a critic of these special tax provisions as Professor Stanley Surrey
has been moved to note that many of them "were expressly adopted to induce
actions which the Congress considered in the national interest."2
To belabor the obvious, the charitable deduction was not inserted in the
tax system to provide windfall gains to the wealthy but, in Professor Surrey's
words, "to foster philanthropy." As we are about to see, however, the providers of that philanthropy constitute a varied lot.
THE NATURE AND COMPOSITION OF TAX EXPENDITURES
As it turns out, there is a classification of special tax provisions which is
available for our use. In recent years, the term tax expenditures has been applied to those features of the tax law which have often been labeled as
loopholes. A formal definition is more descriptive, albeit somewhat formidable: revenue losses attributable to provisions of the federal tax laws which
allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income, or
which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax
liability.
Before turning to the data, however, a critique of the tax expenditure concept is in order. On its surface, that dreadful phrase may seem to be an anomaly: either something is a tax or it is an expenditure. According to Professor
Surrey, who is generally acknowledged to be the father of the tax expenditure
concept, "The term 'tax expenditure' has been used to describe those special
provisions of the federal tax system which represent government expenditures made through that system to achieve various social and economic objec-
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tives."3 The notion that the tax incentive device involves the expenditure of
government funds is, in my opinion, a fundamental error, however, and one
that leads to all sorts of erroneous public policy.
The Surrey view seems to be based on the implicit assumption that the
state is entitled to as much of the taxpayers' income as it desires. Hence, the
citizen's claim on his or her own income is secondary or residual. Thus, any
reduction in that How of private income to the public Treasury is viewed as an
act of grace by a benevolent sovereign. To the contrary, a tax expenditure-if
the concept is to have any justification-signifies less taking of private funds
by government. This is a simple but powerful point. In my view, tax expenditures should be seen in the context of the substantial taxes which are being
paid by private individuals and corporations. To tell a person who is paying
out over a third of his or her income in federal taxes that he or she is unduly
benefiting from some tax expenditure reflects a strange view of tax ~quity.
And to be told that by a beneficiary of the low income allowance compounds
the insult.
Tax expenditures or tax incentives are designed to alter private behavior
in an economy already strongly influenced by government; they are intended
specifically to increase private expenditure on a particular item or category.
From a purely fiscal viewpoint, a dollar less paid in taxes has the same effect
on the budget position as a dollar more disbursed by government. But, a
variety of different consequences may How from choosing the tax or the expenditure route for achieving public purposes.
An important shortcoming of the tax expenditure concept arises from the
method used in estimating the dollar magnitudes. The data reported do not
take any of the indirect effects from the operation of each of these special tax
provisions into account.4 Many of the tax expenditures alter taxpayer
behavior and economic conditions. In many cases that is their purpose. Their
elimination also might require offsetting changes in federal expenditure programs or in other aspects of the tax system in order to avoid obviously
undesirable effects- but thus preventing the Treasury from recapturing the
full revenue loss. The tax exemption of interest received on state and local
bonds is an interesting case in point. On the surface, this provision appears
merely to provide tax relief to the high bracket holders of these securities.
And numerous tax reformers urge the prompt elimination of this "loophole"
on that basis. But, on reflection, the tax exemption enables the states and
localities to issue bonds at lower interest rates than other borrowers of comparable risk categories. (Certainly, the purchasers of these securities would
turn to higher yield issues if the interest were to become taxable.)
Thus, some of the tax expenditure also implicitly involves a substantial
subsidy to the governmental units issuing these securities. In fact, the more
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sophisticated tax reform proposals designed to eliminate or reduce the use of
the tax-exempt securities do provide for the payment of federal subsidies to
state and local governments to offset the higher interest payments that they
would have to make in order to sell their securities in the "taxable market."
Depending on the subsidy level, there could be a net loss or a net gain to the
Treasury from the combination of closing the tax-exemption loophole and simultaneously subsidizing state and local governments to enable them to continue selling bonds at low interest costs.s
Despite these and other shortcomings, the available data on tax expenditures are useful in making some rough approximations of the distribution of
the beneficiaries of tax loopholes. The results may well come as a surprise to
many of the enthusiastic but less critical supporters of the concept.
Some of the "tax expenditures" are well known and have become notorious. A few ready examples are depletion allowances, the tax exemption of the
interest on state and local bonds, and those provisions which have been used
to shelter certain types of real estate income (such as expensing of interest and
taxes paid during the construction of buildings). However, it may come as a
surprise to many that these items comprise a relatively small portion of the
$95 billion of tax expenditures-losses in revenue-reported by the Treasury
Department in the fiscal year 1976.6 The great bulk of the $95 billion, rather,
consists of items which I suspect the vast majority of the public never thinks of
as a loophole.
Among the largest tax expenditures, for example, are the deductibility of
mortgage interest and property taxes on owner-occupied residences. The tax
treatment of these two items of personal expense of the typical homeowner accounts for a total of $8.9 billion of revenue foregone in the fiscal year 1976.
Other significant special provisions include deducting charitable contributions ($5.4 billion revenue loss to the Treasury), personal, state, and local
taxes, other than on homes ($8.0 billion) and excluding from taxation employer and self-employed contributions to employee pensions ($8.4 billion),
medical insurance premiums and medical care programs for employees ($4.5
billion), as well as social security and unemployment benefits ($7.0 billion).
However, merely reciting specific examples such as these may give a distorted picture of the total reality. Tables 2.1 and 2.2, therefore, are an attempt
to show the overall distribution of tax expenditures by income class. The data
on tax expenditures are taken from the official tabulation in the annual
federal budget. The assignment of tax expenditure benefit to income classes is
based on a Treasury Department study of 1971 data prepared for the Joint
Economic Committee.7 I have divided the data into three categories-benefits
to the lower-income groups, to middle-income groups, and to upper-income
groups.
The amounts shown in the category "lower-income groups" are based on
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the proportion of each tax expenditure in 1971 received by those taxpayers
with adjusted gross income of $10,000 or less. The data for the "middle-income groups" are based on the proportion of each tax expenditure in the base
year going to taxpayers with adjusted gross income of $10,000 to $50,000.
Frankly, I would have preferred using a lower top limit for the middle grouping, but the Treasury did not split up the category, $20,000 to $50,000. Nevertheless, the bulk of the tax expenditures (56 percent in 1971) was received by
the bottom half of the middle group-those reporting adjusted gross incomes
of $10,000 to $20,000. The "upper-income groups" in these tables consist of
taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes of $50,000 and over. I have made no attempt to trace through the incidence of the tax expenditures received by corporations, although I would expect that a substantial portion of the ultimate
benefit is received by lower-income and middle-income groups.
The public finance literature provides a variety of viewpoints. Personally, I
subscribe to a mixed case, in which some of the benefits are shifted forward to
consumers in the form of lower prices, some are shifted backward to employees in the form of higher incomes and fringe benefits, and some significant
amount benefits the shareholders. Examples of probable backward shifting,
although relatively small, may be the most apparent. I have in mind here the
tax credit for employing welfare recipients and the increase in the investment
credit for the companies that use the proceeds to finance employee stock
ownership plans.
Table 2.1
SUMMARY OF TAX EXPENDITURES, FISCAL YEAR 1976
(in billions of dollars)
Amount
Estimated benefits to lower
income groups
Estimated benefits to middle
income groups
Estimated benefits to upper
income groups
Estimated benefits to
corporations
Total
Source: Summary of details shown in Table 2.2

Percent of Total

$17.9

19

38.6

40

15.9

17

22.9

24

95.3

100

As shown in Table 2.1, the bulk of all the estimated tax expenditures are
received by lower- and middle-income taxpayers-$56.5 billion out of $95.3
billion in 1976, or 59 percent of the total. By and large, the major recipients of
the tax expenditure benefits received by personal (as contrasted to corporate)
taxpayers are those in the middle-class category-$38.6 billion compared to
$17.9 billion for the lower-income category and $15.9 billion for the upper-income category.
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Table 2.2 continued
Benefit Primarily to Middle-Income Group

Several large tax expenditures benefit primarily lower-income taxpayers.
Among these are the tax exemption of various government transfer or benefit
payments which are received primarily by low-income people who would
otherwise have to pay taxes on such income, e.g., veteran's disability compensation payments ($595 million of revenue foregone), social security benefits
($2. 7 billion), and unemployment benefits ($3.3 billion).
To be sure, several important types of tax expenditures tend to benefit primarily corporations and investors and other relatively high-bracket income
earners. Examples in this category include the special tax treatment of capital
gains ($7.9 billion), the investment credit ($9.5 billion), the exclusion ofinterest on state and local debt ($4.8 billion), and the excess of percentage over
cost depletion ($1.3 billion). Clearly, the $95.3 billion of tax expenditures in
the fiscal year 1976 cannot be characterized as merely an array of depletion
allowances and other very specialized or esoteric tax provisions.
Table 2.2 shows the great variety of the specific tax expenditures for which
the Treasury Department publishes estimated dollar magnitudes. A detailed
analysis of the derivation of the income class distributions is contained in the
statistical appendix.
Table 2.2
ESTIMATED TAX EXPENDITURES, FISCAL YEAR 1976
(in millions of dollars)

Item of Tax Expenditure
Lower
Income

Benefit To Income Group
Middle
Upper
CorpoIncome
Income
rations

Total

765

245

10

1,020

Disability insurance benefits

277

46

7

330

Exclusion of social security benefits

2,153

491

81

2,725

Additional exemption for the blind

14

6

101

90

4

195

1,968

1,334

33

3,335

Exclusion of unemployment benefits
Exclusion of public assistance benefits

20

95

16

7

30

162

70

305

275

607

263

1,145

26

58

26

110

10

21

9

40

46

101

43

190

Retirement income credit and credit for
the elderly
Exclusion of capital gain on home if over
65
Exclusion of railroad retirement system
benefits

155

342

148

645

Exclusion of special benefits for disabled
coal miners

12

27

11

50

Exclusion of income earned abroad by
U.S. citizens

32

110

3

145

Expensing of certain capital outlays by
farmers

159

241

55

85

540

Capital gains treatment of certain
income of farmers

110

167

38

10

325

90

288

52

430

Deduction of interest on consumer credit

316

1,684

105

2,105

Deduction of mortgage interest on
residences

779

3,799

292

4,870

Deduction of property taxes on
residences

564

2,902

564

4,030

49

194

162

100

505

3

15

7

15

40

283

295

12

590

1,980

5,383

987

8,350

217

556

57

830

1,212

3,008

270

4,490

133

164

13

310

4

6

Benefits for dependents and survivors

Dividend exclusion

Housing rehabilitation
Exclusion of workers' compensation
benefits

Exclusion of benefits and allowances to
armed forces personnel

95

90

20

7

Exclusion of G.I. Bill benefits
Additional exemption for over 65

48

73

Exclusion of veterans' pensions

Depreciation on rental housing in excess
of straight line

Benefit Primarily to Lower-Income Group

Exclusion of sick pay

22

Exclusion of military disability pensions

Exclusion of pension contributions and
earnings
Exclusion of employer-paid premiums
on accident and life insurance
Exclusion of employer-paid medical
insurance premiums and medical
care
Exclusion of employer provided meals
and lodging

Deduction and credit for child and
dependent care expenses

241

49

290

Exclusion of scholarships and fellowships

144

51

195

Exclusion of income of trusts to finance
supplementary unemployment
benefits

595

Exclusion of interest on life insurance
savings

215

1,225

215

Deduction of charitable contributions

531

2,496

1,843

Deduction of medical expenses

764

1,389

162

2,315

84

167

59

310

Exclusion of veteran's disability
compensation

309

280

6

Excess of percent standard deduction
over low-income allowance

855

274

11

1,140

Earned income credit

165

53

2

220

Subtotal

7,087

6

2,919

154

10,160

Deduction of casualty losses

7

10
1,655
540

5,410

Table 2.2 continued

Table 2.2 continued

Parental personal exemptions for
students, age 19 and over

209

Deduction of nonbusiness state and local
taxes

823

Credit and deduction for political
contributions

418
4,584

720

93

7,965

2,558

8

19

8

35

Deferral of capital gain on home sale

135

659

51

845

Credit for purchase of new home

104

507

39

650

Deferral of interest on savings bonds

132

292

126

550

29

94

17

145

321

139

9,736

32,365

8,524

790

51,415

439

1,830

5,051

545

7,865

Excess first-year depreciation
Maximum tax on earned income
Subtotal

40

180
605

Benefit Primarily to Upper Income Group
Capital gains
Capital gains treatment of royalties on
coal and iron ore
Subtotal

Benefit Primarily to Corporations
Investment credit

2

10

28

15

55

441

1,840

5,079

560

7,920

507

923

380

7,685

9,495

10

10

225

425

Credit for employing AFDC and public
assistance recipients
Depreciation on buildings (other than
housing) in excess of straight line

24

96

80

Employee stock ownership plans
financed through investment credit
Exemption of credit unions
Exclusion of certain income of
cooperatives

-33

-104

-18

Corporate surtax exemption
Capital gains treatment of certain timber
income

11

28

56

25

25

145

145

410

255

4,170

4,170

290

385

Expensing of exploration and
development costs

14

59

87

640

800

Excess of percentage over cost depletion

23

105

157

1,010

1,295

Exclusion of interest on state and local
debt

17

263

1,365

3,115

4,760

5

17

3

1,325

1,350

52

114

49

415

630

40

40

1,220

1,220

Expensing of research and development
Expensing of construction period
interest and taxes
Exclusion of gross-up on dividends of
LDC corporations
Deferral of income of Domestic
International Sales Corporations
Special tax rate for western hemisphere
trade corporations

50

50

Deferral of tax on shipping companies

110

110

8

Railroad rolling stock five-year
amortization

-25

-25

Excess bad debt reserve of financial
institutions

485

485

Credit for corporations in U.S.
possessions

240

240

21,585

25,865

Subtotal

620

1,501

2,159

Total
17,884
38,625
15,916
22,935
95,360
Source: Data in total column and for corporations taken from Special Analyses, Budget of the
United States Government, Fiscal Year 79 78.

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TAX INCENTIVES
Many justifications have be·en put forward for the various special tax provisions. Typical national objectives cited by the proponents have ranged from
fostering employment and economic growth, to enhancing equity, to supporting worthy private institutions and state and local governments. The specific
weight given to any of these objectives is, of course, a rather subjective matter.
The special treatment of the major tax expenditures received by upper-income taxpayers and corporations-capital gains, the investment credit, and
similar items-is justified by the need to promote investment and hence
achieve a growing economy, which will provide both more employment and a
rising standard of living for the public as a whole. We need to recall also that
the special tax treatment of capital gains was instituted prior to the insertion
of the income-averaging concept into the Internal Revenue Code. In that earlier period, were capital gains to have been taxed at ordinary income rates,
many taxpayers would have been paying taxes on long-term gains far higher
than the brackets that would correspond to their income levels during the
period in which those gains were accruing (that is the "bunching"
phenomenon). Now that income averaging has been extended to capital
gains, the primary justification for differential treatment must be viewed in
other terms-providing desired inducements to investment. We should be
aware of the obvious: to the extent that the private sector is unable to raise the
funds to finance economic growth, pressure rises for greater governmental involvement in business affairs.
Surely in recent years the federal government has become an important
competitor for investment funds. The Treasury's financing of budget deficits
plus a growing array of federally owned or federally sponsored credit agencies
have obtained one-third or more of the total funds flowing through the
nation's capital markets.s Viewed from this prospective, the various tax expenditures devoted to encouraging private investment may merely offset the
deleterious effects of the government's own expenditure and borrowing activities.
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Turning to another major tax expenditure, the deductibility of state and
local taxes furthers the objective of strengthening the other levels of government through the federal government's sharing the burden of the taxes levied
by these jurisdictions. This can be viewed as an early "revenue sharing"
effort. Moreover-in the absence of this deduction or a provision with similar
effect-the combination of federal, state, and local income taxes for some taxpayers could result in a total rate close to 100 percent of income, thus bordering on sheer confiscation. When the top bracket of the federal income tax was
93 percent, this was a very real possibility.
Numerous reasons are cited for the tax deductibility of charitable contributions. The voluntary, private institutions thus supported provide diversity and free choice. They can experiment and enter fields too controversial
for government agencies. They often take on responsibilities which otherwise
would be financed entirely by tax revenues.9
The deductibility of interest paid by individuals (that is, interest on personal as opposed to business indebtedness) is a more complicated matter. The
largest portion is interest on mortgages on owner-occupied homes. The
deterioration of many central cities in recent years has strengthened the
justification of enhancing family and neighborhood stability by encouraging
individual home ownership. The deductibility of interest on general consumer
debt may be more difficult to defend. Personally, I find it hard to see why the
general taxpayer should subsidize the families that wish to go into debt to buy
new refrigerators or second cars. In contrast, the interest that individuals receive on their savings is, of course, fully taxable. Perhaps, although unintentionally, this provision also illustrates the tendency of the tax system to tilt in
favor of consumption rather than saving.
Some personal deductions are really reasonable refinements of gross income in order to obtain a fair and equitable concept of a taxable income base.
Cases in point are the deductions of expenses related to earning income, such
as union dues, child care for working wives, work clothing, and fees on safe
deposit boxes for securities. A few corporate tax exemptions-notably the exemption of credit unions and some of the income of cooperatives-are an aid
to those nonprofit institutions organized in the corporate form.
As in each of the other cases cited here, I am making no attempt to assess
the adequacy of these justifications, but merely to emphasize that there is
another side to the traditional tax reform arguments. Although most popular
discussions of tax reform tend to ignore the substantive purposes of many of
these special tax provisions, the underlying literature of public finance does
not. In the most definitive study of personal tax deductions, for example, Professor C. Harry Kahn states that these tax provisions are designed to
"differentiate between taxpayers whose incomes, though apparently equal,
are of different sizes in some relevant sense."lO
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Thus, without prejudging their effectiveness, we should note that at least
some special tax provisions (perhaps the additional exemption for the blind or
the deduction of casualty losses) are intended to further the achievement of
horizontal equity-equal treatment of equals. Professor Kahn goes on to state
that "care must be taken not to designate the tax equivalents [the revenue
foregone from personal deductions] as simple tax losses. If intended to spur
private expenditures, for instance, in the philanthropic domain, the figures
represent more accurately the tax cost to the government of encouraging expenditures which might otherwise have to be undertaken by government."ll
SHORTCOMINGS OF THE TAX INCENTIVE APPROACH
Surely the Internal Revenue Code contains numerous "marginal" subsidies, in which modest tax benefits enable the private sector to continue some
worthy undertakings (hospitals or orphanages, for example) at a fraction of
the cost which the federal Treasury would have to bear should the activities
be run by the state. But there also are tax "shelters" in the Code which provide an inordinate amount of benefit to the recipients or cost to the Treasury,
far out of proportion to their value to society as a whole.
Special tax provisions (tax expenditures) have been criticized on numerous grounds. Many of them, especially the deductions from income, are attacked as being regressive, because they reduce the tax burdem of upper-income taxpayers more than those of lower-income taxpayers. Deductions
clearly do have that effect. Under the deduction approach, the amount of tax
saving per dollar of deductible expenditure depends on the marginal tax
bracket of the taxpayer. Thus, an upper-income taxpayer receives a larger tax
reduction than does a lower-income taxpayer for making the same dollar
amount of charitable contribution or payment of state and local taxes.
In effect, the government subsidizes the taxpayer to the extent of 14· percent of the state and local taxes and charitable contributions. for the individual or family in the lowest tax bracket-when they itemize rather than take the
standard deduction. In the case of those in the top bracket, the government
subsidizes 70 percent of those expenditures, and somewhere in between for
the others. The many taxpayers using the standard deductions receive no tax
benefits from their contributions,l2
From the viewpoint of achieving desired public policy objectives, special
tax provisions lack some of the compelling characteristics of direct expenditures. Typical-but not all-direct expenditure programs offer the following
advantages: the public has a clearer picture of the flow of federal assistance;
the Congress can exercise annual control over the size and distribution of the
benefits; the financial aid given to private individuals and groups can be
weighed against the desirability of government agencies taking direct respon-

11

sibility for the programs in question. This idyllic view, however, is not readily
reconcilable with the reality of trends in the federal budget. In recent years,
the relatively "uncontrollable" expenditure programs-social security pensions, interest on the public debt, unemployment compensation, etceterahave come to dominate total federal spending. In fact, many of these programs do not even appear in the annual appropriation bills but are funded via
so-called permanent and indefinite appropriations.13
PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE
As pointed out earlier in this paper, this is not a plea for the retention of
every special provision in the tax system. To an economist, it is reasonable to
contrast the costs and benefits of various mechanisms for achieving public
policy objectives. It certainly is conceivable that, in some cases, direct expenditures may be a more desirable alternative than tax incentives. In other
cases, credit assistance or regulatory programs or still other approaches may
be preferred, such as just letting the market work. There seems to be little
need to take a doctrinaire attitude and prohibit public policy from using any
one of these alternatives. Rather, the advantages and disadvantages of each
mechanism should be weighed, and the most desirable one used to achieve a
specific objective, be it the encouragement of business investment or the discouragement of environmental pollution.
However, the implications of moving from indirect support through the
tax system to direct federal expenditure subsidies are profound, especially in
the many instances of aid to private, state, and local institutions. Taken
literally (as has been suggested by some tax reformers), this move would mean
putting private hospitals, orphanages, schools, and similar social service and
charitable institutions into the federal budget.l4 The opportunities for federal
influence and control over the conduct of these private organizations would
be obvious and could be very considerable.
Moreover, the constitutional separation of church and state would probably prevent extending such direct general purpose financial support to
church-related medical and educational facilities and certainly to the religious
institutions themselves. The choice between tax incentives and direct federal
expenditures turns out to involve more than the selection among technical
financing mechanisms. The choice involves altering the balance between public and private power in our society. The issue is seldom clearly joined, which
may explain why the debate gets so heated at times.
However, the use of the tax incentive route does not require adhering to
the specific types of tax mechanisms now in use. For example, the deduction
from taxable income is not the only way in which the tax system can be used
to encourage taxpayers to spend some of their money in a manner which ac-
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cords with national interests. It is merely an example of the power of the
status quo. Deductions have been part of the system since the institution of
the income tax law in 1913.
An alternative to the deduction is already available and has been used in
various specific instances: the tax credit, which is a deduction from the ultimate tax liability rather than from taxable income. Although the distinction
between credits and deductions may be considered to be a technical matter
only of interest to specialists, the differences in effects may be very significant
for the individual taxpayer. Given the progressive nature of the personal income tax structure, ordinary deductions are implicitly regressive. Credits can
be more flexible. A credit can be given in terms of a percentage of an expenditure, and various ceilings may be put on the amount of the credit. Moreover,
credits can be extended to that vast portion of low and moderate income taxpayers that do not itemize indiv.idual contributions, but use the standard
deduction.
The credit concept is in widespread use in the corporate tax structure,
where its use ranges from encouraging the employment of welfare recipients
to expanding business plant and equipment. In the individual tax system,
credits are now provided for child and dependent care expenses, retirement
income, and political contributions-sometimes as a voluntary alternative to
the deductions. Suggestions to use tax credits in place of personal exemptions-$750 is the present deduction for each taxpayer and dependent-have
been made by President Carter and Vice-President Mondale, among others.
As pointed out earlier, the value of a deductible dollar varies with the taxpayer's bracket. With a fixed percentage credit, in contrast, a given dollar of
charitable outlay, for example, would generate the same amount of tax saving, regardless of the taxpayer's income level. Of course, the upper-bracket
taxpayers might make a larger donation and thus qualify for a larger absolute
tax benefit, but they would receive the same proportional benefit. Depending
on the percentage allowed as the credit, such a system could reinforce the progressivity of the personal income tax, since those taxpayers whose marginal
rates were below the percentage credit would have their average bill reduced.
Those in the higher brackets would find their tax bills raised if credits were
substituted for deductions.
The mechanism of a tax credit could be important in strengthening the
role of voluntary organizations in our national life by making them more democratic. Because the proposed tax credit would operate to the advantage of
lower- and moderate-income taxpayers, it could help to create a potential new
constituency for private institutions, freeing many of them from their present
dependence on the wealthy few. Unlike the alternative of direct support
through government expenditures, substituting tax credits for personal
deductions would constitute a modest step toward decentralizing decision-
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making in our society and encouraging diversity in the way that social objectives are achieved.
One would wish to cite a less shopworn metaphor, but the typical tax reformer tends to concentrate on the hole rather than on the doughnut. U nfortunately, the existing situation seems to be a fine example of the Lord (or the
Feds, rather) giveth and the Feds taketh away. Private institutions in the
United States, of course, were alive, well, and growing prior to their support
through the income tax system. No doubt the powerful combination of heavy
taxation and the expansion of public philanthropy and functions has adversely affected both the ability and the incentive of private citizens to support private undertakings and has led to the need for offsetting aid via the tax incentive route.
As has been amply demonstrated in another connection, a major long-term
barrier to private sector saving and investment is the large governmental
budget deficits whose financing is competitive with private undertakings. If
the public sector were smaller and its intrusion into the private sector substantially reduced, there might be little need to advocate supporting private institutions via the tax system. To be sure, some private interests-be they business, labor, agriculture, or any other-will always try to enrich themselves at
the expense of the public welfare. But that knowledge should not cause us to
overlook the fundamentally adverse impacts of government action on the private sector.
Perhaps we have come full circle. The aims of the conventional tax reformers and the objectives of the apparent defenders of the status quo may not be
as far apart as they initially appear to be. The reconciliation of the two sets of
objectives may lie in the more widespread understanding of the conditions
that led to the adoption of so many of the special tax provisions in the first
place. The simple elimination of these tax provisions often would leave
unfulfilled the objectives that they are designed to foster. Yet a more effective
approach to public policy might be in dealing with the basic conditions that
often prevent private institutions-business and nonprofit alike-from performing their intended functions, conditions that frequently-and on occasion unwittingly-result from the rapid expansion of governmental activities.
Dealing with those basic conditions would have the added advantage of
avoiding the revenue losses and the equity problems that may result from
using tax incentives.
One example, among many, may help to particularize this general notion.
As many studies have demonstrated, the compulsory minimum wage law
tends to price low-skilled and less-educated workers, especially teenagers, out
of the labor market. To some extent, this adverse effect is offset by tax credits
which are intended to encourage employers to give jobs to this target population. I am confident that if both programs were eliminated simultaneously,

employment would rise, the budget deficit would be reduced, and the general
welfare would be enhanced. But to eliminate the tax expenditure while ignoring the underlying problem, as seems to be the traditional approach to tax reform, would be another exercise in futility.
Similarly, the need for tax incentives to encourage private support of educational institutions arises in large part from the adverse effects of other
governmental actions. The rapid expansion of classrooms and educational
buildings in public institutions has frequently resulted in much of the higher
educational system operating far below capacity and thus pushing up unit
costs. (More generous scholarships directly paid to students would have been
a far more efficient approach.) These upward cost pressures are in addition to
_the basic inflation engendered by federal fiscal and monetary policy.
A similar situation arises in the health field. The overly rapid expansion of
hospitals has resulted in empty beds with attendant upward pressures on unit
costs. And, further, the inflation in health care costs resulting from the
government's medicare and medicaid programs has exacerbated the financial
squeeze facing private health care institutions.
It is cavalier, to say the least, for the naive tax reformers to blithely ignore
all of the adverse impacts of government action on private institutions and
then pick on one of the few areas of public policy-tax expenditures-where
the public sector attempts to undo the damage.
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CONCLUSIONS
In this paper l have attempted to show that a sympathetic examination of
"loopholes" or tax expenditures, to use the more technical and quantifiable
term, can be useful. The mechanism of tax expenditures or incentives may
serve a variety of public purposes, ranging from promoting business investment and economic growth to encouraging private, voluntary organizations.
Indeed, the growth of tax expenditures may be viewed as a reaction to the
severe impacts that the expansion of government power and activities has had
on the viability of private sector institutions. But the prompt elimination of
those obstacles, such as large deficit financing and pervasive government regulation, seems to be an unrealistic expectation. Hence, the reliance on secondbest alternatives, such as tax expenditures, may on occasion be a sensible
route.
The survey of the specific tax expenditures undertaken here reveals that,
in the main, they are not special benefits to the highest-income classes nor the
product of ingenious accountants or attorneys. Rather, the typical tax expenditure benefits primarily middle- and lower-income groups of the population. Nor are the major tax expenditures obtained by engaging in unusual activities. Rather, they are received from such prosaic activities as paying state
and local taxes, owning a home, and working for a company that provides

group insurance and other fringe benefits.
To be sure, not all tax expenditures are of this nature-and not each one
needs to be defended. But the point being made here is that neither should the
entire category be condemned and its elimination urged as an unequivocal
matter of equity.
As pointed out in this paper, there are reforms which could be institutedsuch as more widespread use of the tax credit device-to simultaneously help
to achieve greater progressivity in the tax structure and still serve to attain
the basic purposes intended by the Congress.
Given the current interest in tax reform, it seems evident that proposed
changes should be viewed in a broader context than in the past. Questions of
income distribution and macroeconomic policy have tended to dominate the
discussion of tax reform. But we must also address such other important
aspects as the effects on the respective roles of the public and private sectors
and of federal, state, and local governments and the resultant shifts in the distribution of power in the society.
All in all, tax incentives may, in this imperfect world, often be the most realistic available alternative to achieving such important objectives as enhancing economic growth and employment, strengthening state and local governments, and encouraging a diversity of private, voluntary approaches to meeting society's needs.
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